In,
and inside the bushes and wild meadows of imagination,
beside the fountain of reflection, off the cliffs of
internal skirmishes, by the streaks of conscience and
in the light of consciousness, away from the weariness
and above the lethargy of lassitude, deep in the horizon
of intuition and beyond the margins of banality, up in
the pulpit of vigilance, down in the nadir of assurance
and may be upper in the passion of confidence, within
the waves of options, through the power of inspiration
and by the gift of intuition, at the center of agility,
on the moment of alacrity, right about the infusion of
dexterity, in the vicinity of sprightliness, during the
dispatch of spryness, upon the eruption of celerity,
in the time of liveliness, lies the power of creativity.
Right
by the overarching mastery of signs, there lies the mystery
of symbols where creativity, innovation and novelty unfold
their unconscious power.
The Western epistemological
and ontological understanding of pedagogical interactions
and educational communications are considerably influenced
by the suppositions that focus on signs and their implications.
The emphasis tends to propound the facilitating role of
signs in educational projects, pedagogical planning, curriculum
development, educational policies, and their etiological
implications.
A sign reveals
the correlation between the signified and signifier (de
Saussure, 1966, 66). A sign is not the signifier. The signifier
is the sound-image which transports the signified and the
signified is a concept which refers to something. What
the sign refers to is the referent.
In line with
the first serious work on the sovereignty of the signs
by the Swiss semiologist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913),
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) expanded on the realm
of signs and discussed their three different systems: icons,
indexes, and symbols with their respective focus on resemblance,
cause and effect and convention.
According
to Italian semiotician, Umberto Echo (1976) there are often
cases and examples where the referent of a sign is not
a real object or a subject, but the signified or signifier
of another sign. Thus, the signified or the signifier of
a sign correlation can, in turn, be either the signifier
or the signified of another sign correlation. It is in
the juxtaposition of signs that signification occurs.
The sovereignty
of signs and its discursive implications came to rise by
virtue of the intellectual enlightenment and its outcry
for rationality, positivism, control, prediction, and certitude.
The rationality as defined by the intellectual enlightenment
concentrated on the world of the visible and prescribed
modes of knowing that are strictly embedded within the
borders and constituents of the visible. Logical positivism,
empiricism and their expansionist clamor grew in the midst
of such parades.
Study on
signs was, thus, inspired by the recursive patterns of
rationality and its explicit prescriptive implications.
Neither the semiotics not the semiology of signs were given
a chance to leap beyond the prescribed forms of rationality
and sensibility and therefore they constructed their rational
oriented approaches and celebrated their certitude of signs
without deconstructing their own underlying ontological
and epistemological constituents.
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Along with
the overarching power of the signs, “I” descended to be
identical to “body” and “body” served as the main source
of the interpretive inquiry. The idolization of the body
and its tyrannical multiplicities ushered in the hollowness
of “I” and the alienation of the self.
Johnston (2001,
xvii) writes,
From Marilyn Monroe
to the Spice Girls, from Arnold Schwarzenegger to O. J.
Simpson, from William Taft to Bill Clinton, to your own
naked form reflected in the mirror each morning, we are
taught to read bodies as symbols displaying and revealing
hidden “truths” about the individual and his or her behaviors.
Any discussion of the body becomes complex and muddled
as one tries to analyze how and why certain body types
are attributed certain meanings.
The despotism
of signs contained the definition of intelligibility and
circumscribed the approaches to knowing. The subscription
to sign oriented patterns and paradigms became the criteria
for sensibility, competence, and superiority.
Critiquing
the authoritative presence of such sensibility, Shotter
explains this well by saying, “In fulfilling our responsibilities
as competent and professional academics, we must write
systematic texts; we run the risk of being accounted incompetent
if we do not. Until recently, we have taken such texts
for granted as a neutral means to use how we please. This,
I now want to claim, is a mistake, and now we must study
their influence” (Shotter, 1993, 25).
The government
of signs promoted exclusive interpretation for thinking,
learning and education and thus elbowed aside numerous
other possible forms of understanding. The executive powers
of such exclusion gave rise to a discourse of power where
sensibility had to be ratified by specific channels.
The cultivation
and socialization of the most available perspective on
signs generated numerous forms of reliance on the established
modes of knowing. Education, like other social sciences,
tried hard to bring forth and lead out the clandestine
yet constructive forces of the learner from within on the
strength of the discourse of rationality and sensibility
as prescribed by the intellectual enlightenment.
This, in turn,
highlighted the establishment of a language and a generative
meta language where the paradigmatic and syntagmatic analysis
and assessment of pedagogical approaches and practices
borrowed their sensibility from the binding source of intellectuality
based on the rational understanding of signs. The imperial
power of signs and their inducing command of rationality
turned out to be so inexorably linked to the community
of both educators and learners. Michal Oakeshott had a
notion of such implications when he writes that:
Flattered by circumstance
and linked with ancient heresy, an attempt was made to
promote ‘science’ as itself a ‘culture’ in which human
beings identified themselves in relation to ‘things’ and
to their ‘empire over things,’ but it now deceives no body;
boys do not elect for the ‘science sixth’ expecting to
achieve self-knowledge, but for vocational reasons. (quoted
in Barrow and Woods, 1993, 35)
The idolization of signs and its emphasis
on linear thinking generated a utilitarian objective within
the field of Education and it focused on packaging everything
within the so-called standardization of learning and teaching;
it changed education into a business plan where the agenda
was to sell the right form of thinking and the proper way
of learning. Development, improvement, growth and thinking
were strongly assessed based on their adaptability to the
ontology and epistemology of signs. An obsession with techniques
was highly consecrated. Thus, Education, as actualized
in conventional practices and institutions, enacted the
criteria of sense-making by virtue of its own signs. Education
indoctrinated, blocking alternatives of seeing, perceiving,
and knowing, monopolizing its own as the first and the
foremost reflection of reality as submitted in its own
sign(s).
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It is in line with the hazards of such
obsessions that Habermas (1973) discusses the modern society’s
failure to distinguish between the practical and technical.
The real difficulty in the relation of theory to praxis
does not arise from this new function of science as technological
force, but rather from the fact that we are no longer
to able to distinguish between practical and technical
power. Yet, even a civilization that has been rendered
scientific is not granted dispensation from practical
questions: therefore a particular danger arises when
the process of scientification transgresses the limit
of reflection of rationality confined to the technological
horizon. For then no attempt at all is made to attain
a rational consensus on the part of citizens concerned
with the practical control of their destiny. Its place
is taken by the attempt to attain technical control over
history by perfecting the administration of society,
an attempt that is just as impractical as it is unhistorical.
(255)
Questioning
our taken-for-granted assumptions in the realm of signs,
Herda (1999, 24) indicates that, “Most typically, we take
for granted our social actions, structured or patterned
by language, and we fail to see them.” She revisits our
thinking of thinking and calls for deconstructing the assumptions
governed by the system of signs. Herda (1999) notes that,
The lack of depth
of the current usage of the term “thinking” in the critical
thinking bandwagon undermines the potential of adult or
young leaders to reflect, learn, and act in meaningful
ways. (18)
Looking for
a critical curriculum development that can observe its
own imposition of assumptions, Snyder (2002) puts the courage
into words,
we need to develop
pedagogical and curriculum frameworks that seek to endow
students with a sense of their place in the new global
system, but also with the capacity to view that system
critically. At the very least, we can help our students
to engage in local forms of cultural critique. (181)
To do so,
we might turn to Carl Jung (1875-1961) who departs from
the sign-stricken domain and highlights the significance
of symbols along the path of signs. Jung indicates that
our life and above all, our health, is in dire need of
symbols. He indicates that a life where symbols are concealed
into oblivion generates neurosis, alienation, parochialism,
estrangement, superficiality, and entanglement.
He begins
discussing the significance of symbols by comparing them
with the signs where signs constantly focus on the known,
on the obvious, on the rational, on the visible, on the
accessible and on the available whereas symbols concentrate
on the unknown, the mysterious, the ambiguous, and the
unconscious.
On such preliminary
discussions, Jung (1964) suggests,
A word or an image
is symbolic when it implied something more than its obvious
an immediate meaning. It has a wider unconscious aspect
that is never precisely defined or fully explained. Nor
can anyone hope to define or explain it. As the mind explores
the symbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the grasp
of reason. (20-21)
Jung questions
the containment of reality within the prescriptive modes
of signs and argues that reality is not to be bound by
the visible; the sphere of existence can not be limited
to the domain of the visible signs and the rationality
that seeks the sensibility within the visible world would
be inadequate to reflect and represent the magnitude of
reality. Existence, according to Jung, can be explored
and understood within the domain of signs but can not be
restricted and contained within signs.
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The layers
of existence are far too extensive than being circumscribed
within the territorial integrity of signs. Jung goes beyond
the limitations of the reading of our perceived reality
through signs and highlights the significance of understanding
a new and yet independent realm of existence, meaning making
and sensibility i.e. the realm of symbols.
Our minds are conditioned
to think that only what we can see and touch is real, but
Jung questioned this view, and his psychology is a challenge
to our understanding of reality. Jung was an unsettling
thinker, because he introduced the notion that the evidence
of our sense is illusory, and that common sense is nothing
more than a construct of external conditioning. (12)
Revolutionizing
the modes of thinking, Jung challenges the absolutism of
the scientific discourse and their monarchical manifestations
in endorsing the validity of the truth through logical
positivism and linear forms of thinking. He yearns for
a genuine search for knowledge and wisdom and opens up
the possibility of exploring the genius of inspiration
and intuition as real modes of knowing and learning.
We have become rich
in knowledge, but poor in wisdom. The centre of gravity
of our interest has switched over to the materialistic
side, whereas the ancients preferred a move of thought
nearer to the fantastic type. To the classical mind, everything
was still saturated with mythology. (quoted in Tacey, 2006,
15)
On Jung’s
vital message, Tacey (2006) writes:
We tend to think
of myths and religions as ‘untrue’ and of dreams as ‘distortions
of reality. But for Jung they are expressions of a truth
that is truer than literal truth.
This is Jung’s vital
message, linking him to the ‘perennial philosophy’ and
to wisdom traditions that originate from Heraclitus, Socrates
and Plato. Socrates said truth is not self evident, and
Jung would agree. What we see, and what we seem, is not
the whole truth. Our knowledge is not reliable; it is partial
and undermined by the fact that the unconscious has a separate
truth dimension, of which we are mostly oblivious. Ironically,
deeper truth resides in what we habitually dismiss as illusion,
fantasy, myth and distortion. This may be one reason why,
in an age governed by science and logic, our entertainment
is saturated with fantasy, mythic stories and legends:
a compensatory process has risen in popular culture.
The reason we have
lost access to the deeper truth, for Jung, is that we have
lost access to the symbolic language that discloses it.
Our world-blinded consciousness has made a successful adaptation
to external reality, but the cost has been an atrophy of
our symbolic life. (15)
A Jungian understanding of education
leaps beyond the monosemy and univocity and searches
for multiplicities of meaning while celebrating multiple
ways of knowing. This understanding can be embedded in
lesson planning, instructional materials, curriculum
development, policy making and teaching strategies. For
this, Jung’s project of symbols complies with Ricoeur’s
understanding of language where inventiveness, novelty,
creativity, and innovation unfold their creational power
through a language that goes beyond the sign and sign
oriented limitations.
My
philosophical project is to show how human language is
inventive despite the objective limits and codes which
govern it, to reveal the diversity and potentiality of
language which the erosion of the everyday, conditioned
by technocratic and political interests, never ceases
to obscure. To become aware of the metaphorical and narrative
resources of language is to recognize that its flattened
or diminished powers can always be rejuvenated for the
benefit of all forms of language usage. (465)
A Jungian
understanding of symbols helps the educators understand
the power of intuition and inspiration in enriching the
modes of expressiveness; it is through these powers that
creativity unfolds itself. Jung (1971) pinpoints the significance
of such powers:
Every creative individual
whatsoever owes all that is greatest in his life to fantasy.
The dynamic principle of fantasy is play, a characteristic
also of the child, and as such it appears inconsistent
with the principle of serious work. But without this playing
with fantasy no creative work has ever come to birth. The
debt we owe to the play of imagination is incalculable.
(63)
Bruner (1986)
presented the narrative metaphor in sociology and focused
on the interpretation of text in its broadest sense; culture,
itself, was considered a text with multifarious layers
of meaning. On the relationship between experience, narrative
and meaning, Bruner (1991) indicates that “we organize
our experience and our memory of human happening mainly
in the form of narrative-stories, excuses, myths, reasons
for doing and not doing, and so on” (4).
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Jungian presentation
of symbols protests against the overarching idolization
of science in its linear and empirical exclusive version
and challenges the unquestionably established paradigms
that foster nothing but the transformation of learners
into objects of control and conditioning. As Jung states,
any approach “that satisfies the intellect alone can never
be practical, for the totality of the psyche can never
be grasped by the intellect alone” (1953, 76). He explains,
It cannot be the
aim of education, to turn out rationalists, materialists,
specialists, technicians and others of the kind who, unconscious
of their origins, are precipitated abruptly into the present
and contribute to the disorientation and fragmentation
of society. (quoted in Frey-Rohn, 1974, 182)
A challenge against the subjugation of
signs and its reductionism can be tracked down in and among
the voices that break the reliance on the signs enchainment.
between technical reason, the knowledge
with which we design computers or analyze the structure
of DNA, and practical or moral reason, the ways we understand
how we should live… What we need to know is not simply
how to build a powerful computer or how to redesign DNA
but precisely and above all how to do with that knowledge.
(44)
A Jungian
understanding of symbols would facilitate the process of
teaching and learning with more depth and vigilance; it
would help educators and the learners to openly examine
and explore the taken-for-granted assumptions and critically
look at the construction of knowledge. This understanding
becomes sensitive on how language creates, constructs,
transforms, and positions.
Ha’iri (1992) questions the ubiquitous
implications of signs and challenges the entrenchment
of the sign oriented interpretation of knowing and their
concentrated mobilization for searching the sensibility
within the fences of linear form of thinking and logical
positivism. He highlights the sensibility of mysticism
as a way of understanding while substantiating and corroborating
a wide spectrum of knowing. Ha’iri (1992) revolts against
the Modern Western philosophy’s exclusion of “claims
of awareness from the domain of human knowledge” and
substantiates the meaningfulness of what the Modern way
of knowing brands “mere expressions of fervor or as leaps
of imagination” (5).
When knowing is not just a gerund in
the air, when knowing turns out to be in the words of
Ha’iri Yazdi (1992) “being” and language becomes an “action”
in the words of Habermas (1979), we may better understand
the ontological aspect of signs in terms of their creation.
With a focus on knowing as being, Ha’iri (1992) indicates,
…the inquiry into the nature of the relationship between
knowledge and the knower can lead to the very foundation
of human intellect where the word knowing does not mean
any thing other than being. In this ontological state
of human consciousness the constitutive dualism of the
subject-object relationship is overcome and submerged
into a unitary simplex of the reality of the self that
is nothing other than self-object knowledge. From this
unitary simplex, the nature of self-object consciousness
can, in turn, be derived. (1)
According
to Jung, with the expansion of signs and dissipation of
symbols, fragmentation and disorientation grew with the
ever increasing emergence of self-alienation. The disappearance
of symbols from human life took away wholeness and thus
fragmentation was associated with illness. Jung states,
It seems to me that,
side by side with the decline of religious life, the neuroses
grow noticeably more frequent. We are living undeniably
in a period of greatest restlessness, nervous tension,
confusion, and disorientation of outlook. (quoted in Tacey,
2006, 97)
On the spiritual
dimension of healing and its connectedness to understanding
the role of symbols, Jung says,
During the past
thirty years, people from all the civilized countries of
the earth have consulted me. Many hundreds of patients
have passed through my hands, the greater number being
Protestants, a lesser number Jews, and not more than five
or six believing Catholics. Among all my patients in the
second half of life—that is to say, over thirty-five—there
has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not
that of finding a religious outlook on life.
It is safe to say
that every one of them fell ill, because he had lost what
the living religions of every age have given to their followers,
and none of them has been really healed who did not regain
his religious outlook. This of course has nothing to do
with a particular creed or membership of a church. (Psychotherapists
or the Clergy, CW, 11, 490-509, quoted in Tacey, 2006,
85-86)
According to Jung, an education without attention towards the role and
the implications of symbols, would lead to reductionism,
parochialism, and consumerism. An understanding of the
Jungian discourse of symbols would enhance the power of
creativity and the gift of reflexivity. Jungian discourse
of symbols would invite both the learner and the teacher
to go beyond the mastery of signs and celebrate the mystery
of symbols; it is a promising preamble to vivify the enthusiasm
of searching for multiple ways of knowing and understanding.
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How can educators promote thinking if
they are already enmeshed in limiting packages of signification?
How can learners explore new horizons of thinking if
they are extensively and frequently exposed to the availability
and accessibility of the sign promoting discourses? How
can the educational practices offer any depth if their
layers of constitution are heavily ensconced in linear
forms of engagement and positivist oriented approaches?
And how might learners learn to mindfully reconsider
the correlation of the signifier and signified within
the induced signification? If the learners are consistently
influenced by the socially and politically imposed signified,
can they search for the analysis of correlation between
signifier and signified without being mindfully active?
On the description of some of these engagements,
Lasn (1999) writes,
advertisements are the most prevalent and toxic of
the mental pollutants. From the moment your radio alarm
sounds in the morning to the wee hours of late-night
TV, microjolts of commercial pollution flood into your
brain at the rate of about three thousand marketing messages
per day. Every day, an estimated 12 billion display ads,
3 million radio commercials, and more than 200,000 TV
commercials are dumped into North America’s collective
unconscious. (18-19)
How can learners reflect on their positions
and reexamine their connectedness socially, culturally
and politically if they are bound to think through the
sign inducing forms and orders?
A Jungian understanding of symbols brings
awareness against the privatization of individuals, their
placement into a universe of simulacra and their entrapment
into the flamboyant spectacle that present themselves by
the name of science.
Just as much
as signs lead us to the ordinary transactions, recognition
and understanding of symbols would provide profound reflexivity,
deep contemplation and sensitivity towards the examination
of modes of being. In the words of Tacey (2006) “The study
of signs leads to semiotics, linguistics and discourse
analysis. The study of symbols leads to mythology, religion
and philosophy” (11).
Jung’s discourse
of symbols illustrates the vitality of poetry and poetic
understanding; it illuminates the merit of intuition, inspiration,
and mythical understanding. An understanding of Jung’s
symbols would explicate how a concentration on sign driven
programs and their focus on linear thinking may divest
the learners of voicing themselves and recognizing the
value of their narratives, their “hills and valleys.” It
brings to life the inherent creativity that dwells within
each individual, each child.
Political and utilitarian policy making
seem to prefer and design sign driven educational programs
where engagements in deep critical thinking and creative
examination of the assumptions are not encouraged or marginalized.
Warning against
sign inducing programs, Morgan (2002) argues,
As students start
to question “texts in the world,” they also begin to question
“texts in the mind.” They come to recognize that they are
not necessarily the sole authors of “commonsense” beliefs
but are instead subjects produced through language and
discourse. Such forms of understanding, from a poststructural
perspective, are necessary to imitate attention and action
on social inequalities whose persistence is sustained by
their seeming naturalness. (156)
Jungian understanding
of signs would offer the promise inherent when understanding,
interpretation, is driven not by reading signs, but engaging
in symbols which are metonymic, mysterious, generative,
and polysemic.
To Ricoeur (1991) “it is the task of poetry
to make words mean as much as they can and not as little
as they can” (449). In and through poetry, one may say,
language can be liberated from the constrictions of sign
driven discourse, and new layers of reality can be revealed.
Ricoeur (1991) argues that “through this recovery of the
capacity of language to create and re-create, we discover
reality itself in the process of being created. So we are
connected with this dimension of reality which is unfinished”
(462).
Speaking on the role of metaphor and the
process of becoming for language, Ricouer (1991) describes
the language of poetry and its significant role in making
the reality: “language in the making celebrates reality
in the making” (462). Making a distinction
between the language of ordinary speech where the signs
have established their authority and the language of poetry
in dealing with reality, he remarkably presents a striking
characteristic of ordinary language versus the language
of poetry,
And the rest of our language in ordinary
speech and so on has to do with reality as it is already
done, as it is finished, as it is there in the sense of
the closedness of what is, with its meaning which is already
asserted by the consensus of wise people. (Ricouer, 1991,
462)
Ricouer (1991, 85) propounds
that “with metaphor we experience the metamorphosis of
both language and reality.” He does not submit to the pervasive
discourse of signs and its clamorous quest for defining
the reality in sign inducing exegesis. He says,
We could say that in scientific language
there is an attempt to reduce as much as possible this
polysemy, this plurivocity to univocity: one word-one sense.
But it is the task of poetry to make words mean as much
as they can and not as little as they can. Therefore, not
to elude or exclude this plurivocity, but to cultivate
it, to make it meaningful, powerful, and therefore to bring
back to language all its capacity of meaningfulness. (1991,
449)
Ricoeur (1991) identifies the imperialism
of the discourse of signs:
If it is true that poetry gives no information
in terms of empirical knowledge, it may change our way
of looking at things, a change which is no less real than
empirical knowledge. What is changed by poetic language
is our way of dwelling in the world. From poetry we receive
a new way of being in the world, of orienting ourselves
in the world. Even if we say with Northrop Frye that poetic
discourse gives articulation only to our moods, it is also
true that moods as well as feelings have an ontological
bearing. Through feelings we find ourselves already located
in the world. In this way, by articulating a mood, each
poem projects a new way of dwelling. It opens up a new
way of being for us. (85)
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A symbol-oriented educational program
would immensely appreciate the invaluable presence of
art and literature while sign-oriented pedagogy would
cunningly ignore them. In support for the presence of
such symbol promoting programs and their implications,
Jung (1966) indicates,
The great secret
of art and the creative process consists in the unconscious
activation of an archetypal image, and in elaborating and
shaping this image into the finished work. By giving it
shape, the artist translates it into the language of the
present, and so makes it possible for us to find the way
back to the deepest springs of life. (82)
The mastery
of signs produces an education where techne replaces phronesis and the questions of ethics and values become superannuated
except for the flirtations that can cuddle the leisure
time of the sign players. The mastery of signs dehumanizes
the individual and promotes consumerism, utilitarianism,
intellectualism, absence, fragmentation, and reductionism.
The hegemony
of the sign and its underlying quest for power tends to
sustain and reproduce voices that support the hegemonic
predominance; voicing against the constituent rules of
this hegemony would be considered as one of the most supercilious
acts; the subtle indoctrination of signs silences the questioning
of the mastery of signs.
The mystery
of symbols would celebrate the power of inspiration, heart
and spirit, imagination and intuition, mysticism and unconsciousness.
Symbols link the earth to the sky and the mind to the heart.
The mystery of symbols echo the tintinnabulation of connectedness,
wholeness, belonging and togetherness, it calls for transcendence,
it moves toward above and is brim with awe.
A symbolic
understanding of symbols would follow the avenues of mysticism,
the meanders of wonder, the wild meadows of reflective
imagination and the dialectic of mindfulness and heartfulness.
A symbolic understanding of symbols would promise an act
of creativity.
The act of
creativity is not searching for the sameness, is not in
pursuit of congruence or compatibility, and is not moving
towards convergence. Creativity is not bound to coherence,
cohesiveness, conformity, correspondence or consistency
in a sign oriented paradigm. Creativity may represent an
act of revelation where things are revealed in light of
creativity and unconsciousness as it can be an act of disclosure
where things are cryptically and yet creatively presented.
Creativity is not dutifully at the service of the recognized
order as it is not respectful of the relationships and
their establishment within the government of signs. Creativity
may bring chaos and disorder but this chaotic situation
is only as a result of a comparison between the act of
creativity and the previously identified system of order
within the plane of signs.
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About the
Author
Sayyed
Mohsen Fatemi, Ph.D., holds doctorates in language and literacy
education and psychology and teaches graduate and undergraduate
courses in the Department of Educational Studies, Faculty
of Education at the University of British Columbia. In
addition to several published books on areas of education,
language, communication and psychology, his articles
and poetry have been published in international and scholarly
journals in Canada, USA, Australia, and overseas. His
new books are in press by Edwin Mellen Press in New York.
Some of his areas of interest are: creativity, language
and discourse, philosophy of education, phenomenology,
psychoanalysis, deep psychology, psychology of mass media,
intercultural skills and hermeneutics, negotiations and
emotional intelligence. Email: Sayyedmohsen.fatemi@ubc.ca
