ON-LINE ISSUES

V.5 N.1, August 1999

The Ethics of Justice and Care in the Respect for Persons Principle: Implications for Education

by Miriam Mwada Orkar
mmorkar@interchange.ubc.ca

Centre for the Study of Curriculum & Instruction
University of British Columbia

Some theoretical moralists have argued that the attitude of respect for persons is the paramount moral attitude, and that all other moral principles are to be explained in terms of it. Although bringing children to have respect for others is generally regarded as a central task of moral and social education, not much is found in educational literature on what it means to have respect for persons. In this paper, I outline the basic philosophical assumptions that underlie the concept of respect for persons in the light of its relationship to the ethics of justice and care. I have drawn from a variety of philosophical considerations to demonstrate that the ethics of care and justice are jointly necessary, and mutually complementary, to the propriety of the respect-for-persons principle.

". . . the sense of justice is a necessary part of the dignity of a person, and . . . it is this dignity which puts a value upon the person distinct from and logically prior to his capacity for enjoyment and his ability to contribute to the enjoyment of others," (Rawls, 1967, p. 139).

Most philosophers would agree that the ethic of justice constitutes a major account of the respect-for-persons principle, and that one way to show respect for persons as persons is to honour the rights which they and all other people have.

The concept of justice, in the sense that it is being used here, is fundamentally concerned with fairness--that is, that persons simply as persons should all be viewed as mattering equally, and should have equal rights to freedom and opportunities in the moral community. This moral principle of impartiality has so far been ultimate in terms of the framing and the execution of law, and moral action generally. As Clement (1996) points out, the ethic of justice tends to focus on "general principles rather than paying attention to contextual detail, on the self as an independent individual rather than self in relation to others, and on varying commitments to equality rather than commitments to maintaining relationships" (p. 110). Moreover, the ethic of justice mainly concerns our treatment of one person other than ourselves, in relation to another person other than ourselves. It does not govern the treatment of others in relation to ourselves. The ethic of care, on the other hand, concerns a personal commitment to treat a person with integrity based on a certain understanding of one’s relationship to the other. The ethic of care depends on the importance of a subjective recognition of intimate relations, and it is born out of the more encompassing vision of how fully connected each and every individual is.

The first articulation of the notion of respect for persons is found in Kant’s second statement of the categorical imperative which states: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, always as an end and never as a means only” (Foundations of the metaphysics of morals, 1959, p. 47). Beside some critics (e.g., Johnson, 1982; Landesman, 1982) who refute Kant’s ideology of the ethical requirements of respecting persons, most philosophical theorists interested in the subject of respect for persons maintain that they are relying on and developing a central feature of Kant’s moral philosophy (Brody, 1982; Cranor, 1975, 1982; Donagan, 1977; Downey and Telfer, 1969). Hence, this discussion espouses Kant’s theoretical notions of respect for persons. One of Kant’s statements that demonstrates his implicit regard for every rational being as inherently possessing of virtue and worthy of respect is found in the The Doctrine of Virtue, 1964: “I cannot deny all respect to even the immoral man as a man; I cannot withdraw, at the least, the respect that belongs to him in his quality as a man even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of that quality” (p. 463).

This way of regarding persons falls more within the domain of the ethic of care than it does the ethic of justice. To illustrate, let me give an example of how the two ethics might interplay in everyday human interactions, and demonstrate why the ethic of care must be given a more privileged consideration, especially in situations where compassion is required, and where one intends to uphold the respect-for-persons principle.

Suppose a rich person lends some money to a poor neighbour and the poor neighbour is not able to pay back. First, on the account of the ethic of justice, the debtor, could be considered immoral by failing to pay her debt as promised. It might also be considered "just" for the lender to demand the payment of his money even if the debtor has to sell off the only pair of shoes she owns to pay the debt. One could further argue that the lender, by demanding the debtor to pay him back is treating the debtor as an equal. However, on the account of the ethic of care, the lender needs only to examine the situation to ascertain that the debtor is truly not able to pay the debt. Then, if the lender truly respects the debtor as one deserving of dignity, he will be more inclined to consider writing off the debt to save the debtor from going without shoes than to insist on the settlement of his claims.

To further support this point I refer to Benn's (1973) article "Abortion, Infanticide and Respect for Persons" in which he argues that the foetus is not a person and thus has no moral rights usually associated with persons. Yet, he goes on to offer an account against abortion as follows:

. . . Person that will be (provided he grows up) will be emotionally stunted or impaired if he is deprived of love and tender care as an infant; it is for the sake of those that will grow into persons that we take care of all babies now. For not to do so for some--those that we regard as expendable or dispensable--might well lead us in to a callous unconcern for others too. (p. 102)

The word "care" in the above quotation signifies what Gilligan (1987) refers to as "the mercy that tempers justice"(p. 24); and it connotes the special obligations or supererogatory duties that arise in personal relationships. Thus, even though according to Benn's argument, it might be justifiable for a woman carrying an unwanted pregnancy, to terminate the pregnancy, this "care" would provide some motivation to endure the pregnancy and give birth to the baby. Moreover, this "care" is not only associated with the particular baby she is carrying, but all babies, including those who are already born.

The above examples demonstrate that there are cases in which rights are not relevant, but in which we are not to behave in certain ways simply because behaving in those ways shows a lack of respect for the persons involved; also, they show that the respect-for-persons principle as a basic moral consideration has more far-reaching implications than what is usually understood by the moral requirements of "rights," "equality," and "justice." It is possible to observe people's rights, treat them as equals, and be just in our dealing with them and yet fail to respect them as persons. Hence we do (and should) go beyond our commitments to social justice in dealing with every member of the moral community. This is not to downplay the importance of regarding the rights of persons in the respect-for-persons principle. Indeed, it is generally agreed that respecting persons involves at least not violating their rights. However, as Landesman (1982) and Cranor (1982) point out, if it is held that persons are to be respected just because they have rights, or that respecting persons is simply having a proper regard for their rights, the notion of respect-for-persons tends to lose independent interest. The point here is that the ethic of justice is necessary, but not sufficient, as a requirement for the propriety of the principle of respect for persons. Moreover, the ethic of justice presupposes scarcely any knowledge of situational specifics (Nunner-Winkler, 1984); rather, we must view ourselves in abstraction from our personal circumstances, and hence with a "detachment . . . from the level of all motivations and perceptions other than those of an impartial character" (William, 1981, p. 5). What is required by the ethic of justice is not to act in a specified way at any time or location. All one needs to know are some general empirical facts valid for all situations (e.g., for the rule, Do not kill, relevant facts are all potential risks to life). Thus, an aspiration to act in accordance with the impartialist principle alone not only denies us of the contact orientation, which is a central requirement in the respect-for-persons principle, but also alienates us from ourselves, that is from those projects that are centrally definitive of ourselves and which tend to enhance our self-respect. Furthermore, on the level of our basic human instinct, we are not principally motivated to do things for our friends and loved ones out of a sense of duty or justice. I do things for my friend, for example, not as an instance of a type to whom I have certain general obligations, but in direct response to the particular, unique person that she is. The demands of justice or impartial principle are not so restricted in scope, and there is no place in an ethic of justice for respecting the particularity of intimate relations, but as Gilligan (1987) points out, we need both ethical perspectives in our private and public dealings with others:

All human relationship, public and private, can be characterised both in terms of equality and in terms of attachment, and. . . both inequality and detachment constitute grounds for moral concern. Since everyone is vulnerable both to oppression and to abandonment, two moral visions--one of justice and one of care--recur in human experience. The moral injunctions, not to act unfairly towards others, and not to turn away from someone in need, captures these different concerns. (p. 20)

Let us consider the ethical relationship between a student and a teacher, for example. One might say that this relationship exists within a justice framework. However, it should be predominantly a caring relationship. Noddings (1984), in her book Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education indulges in a discourse about an ethical notion whose ideal strives to maintain and enhance caring. Noddings' (1984) ideal of ethical care in a teacher-student relationship identifies the teacher as the “one-caring” and the student as the “cared-for.” According to her, the “one-caring” is engrossed in the “cared-for” and undergoes a motivational displacement towards the project of the “cared-for.” She states: "A teacher receives not just the students' 'response' but the student. What he says matters, whether it is right or wrong, and she probes gently for clarification, interpretation, and contribution. She is not seeking the answer, but the involvement of the ‘cared-for’" (p. 176).

The caring relationship between a student and a teacher as construed by Noddings (1984) should characterise every classroom atmosphere. The classroom situation should be where care operates within a justice framework, and where the interpretations of care should leave the basic assumptions of the justice framework intact (Gilligan 1987) which are the situational version of Aristotle’s (quoted in MacLagan, 1960) statement: ". . . when people are friends there is no need of justice" (p. 201). Indeed, most people would agree that friendship is something better than mere justice, and as if it were, effectively includes it.

However, in unprecedented situations, we do witness, probably due to our human frailty, cases where friends have to appeal to the ethic of justice, in order to settle their arguments. Similarly, in a school set-up where a teacher enters into an agreement with a school to work with young children, the teacher is simultaneously taking on an obligation to have an attitude of justice towards the children. Most of the time, the teacher's interactions with students should take place in the context of care. However, it is appropriate that the ethic of justice is under-girding the relationship in this moral enterprise. The point I am making is that in view of creating a more natural, enjoyable relationship, most people may find it more desirable to operate in the realm of care. However, in view of our human frailty and the tendency to resist the call to sacrifice our own self-interest for the sake of others, it serves well to have a justice framework within which to exhibit our commitment of care.

I conclude this section by illustrating what I mean by the inadequacy of the ethic of justice, when it stands alone in the classroom situation. This is an account of an actual classroom event, wherein Masiclat (1987) in "Teaching Ethics" describes a scene in which he was involved, having returned to his former high school, as a substitute teacher. He begins his story:

Much had happened in the eight years since I had been a student in that school. I had graduated from college and spent four years in the Marine corps. Now, struggling to become a writer, I found myself back at my old high school, teaching to help make ends meet. As I called off each name on the attendance roster I was reminded of my own experiences when as a student, I would wait to respond "Here" to the questioning call of my name. The flood of Nostalgia was suddenly dammed, however, when instead of the customary "here" or "yeah", I was answered with a particularly vicious insult. Now what, I thought. "I beg your pardon?" I said, too stunned to say much else and not really wanting to believe what I heard. "You heard me, You’re just a f...in' sub, and I ain't stayin’ here!" As he said this, he stood up and faced me defiantly, all of 16 years old. What could I do? I am not by nature a tolerant man, and four years as infantry hadn't made me more so. As I faced the rebel, I couldn't help being angry with him. He had insulted me publicly and threatened my authority as the class teacher. A hundred thoughts raced through my mind. I should pound this worm into a pulp. I should call the principal, as the official instructions in these matters advised. I wonder why he hates me so? I wonder why he is doing this to himself? What must his home be like? Can I take him? All the while he stood there, chest out, chin high, wondering perhaps if he had beaten the system once again. He turned to leave and my mind was made up. No, I thought, you will not walk out of here and destroy my credibility in front of this class, and you will not be sent to the principal's office to idle away an hour. I will not throw you away and stuff you into someone else's problem bin. I will do my job and try to teach you something. "Sonny, put your ass back in that chair, or I will kick it all over this room!" I said, with all the venom I could marshal, praying he wouldn't take the challenge. Luckily, he didn't, and the class went on as normally as it can when such a thing happens. (pp. 275-6)

It seems apparent that Masiclat's concern (almost to the point of obsession), is with the fact that the behaviour of the sixteen-year-old student is unexpected, and out of context. He, therefore, as a teacher, perceives a need to teach the student some sense. He takes upon himself the responsibility to teach the student, at all cost that, the teacher, regular or substitute, has authority over the student in matters dealing with the classroom situation. Therefore the student must behave in such a way as to meet the teacher's expectation of student behaviour, and to do as he is told no matter what the student's feelings about obedience is at that point. As a teacher, Masiclat feels he has to respond to the "voice of ethical conscience, the same subtle nagging that tells you something is not right" (p. 276). Responding to the voice of ethical conscience to him must have meant getting to deliberate within himself in quest of the line of action to take, albeit, at the exclusion of the interest of the student, and without a serious consideration of the prevailing circumstances that might have led to this defiant behaviour, or if he had entertained such considerations, he had failed to communicate them. Hence, in my opinion, Masiclat's response accomplished little in terms of assisting the sixteen-year-old to come to terms with his deepest feelings and to perceive himself as a “cared-for,” who in my opinion desperately needs care, at this point, being well-deserving of acceptance in a complete and non-reserved fashion.

As teachers, we must care for our students in a total manner such that we can be concerned for their emotional well-being in the same way that we are concerned about their academic performance. As Moore states (1992) states:

The great malady of the twentieth century implicated in all of our troubles and affecting us individually and socially is "loss of the soul." When soul is neglected, it doesn't just go away; it appears symptomatically in obsessions, addictions, violence and loss of meaning. . . the root problem is that we have lost our wisdom about the soul, even our interest in it. (p. xi)

How then, could Masiclat have helped the youngster to come to terms with his desperate need to respect persons as persons and not necessarily as persons in authority? My response to this question is to say that the student needs to be viewed as a student with a certain particularity and not just as a student--any student. . . As Whitehead (1967) observes, "mankind is naturally specialist," so that wherever "in education you exclude specialism, you destroy life" (p. 10). I also believe a private dialogue with the student might have given the student a better sense of self-worth; and that might have subsequently enabled him to share some of his frustrations. Freire (1993) refers to this kind of dialogue as the essential humanising activity. Such a dialogue has the power to not merely point out where the misunderstanding lies but also to solidify the relationship between the “one-caring” and the one “cared-for.”

In conclusion, I reiterate my main argument in this paper, which is that the traditional impartialist theories that have hitherto dominated Western moral philosophy are inadequate to address problems associated with the attitude of respect for persons. The ethic of justice and the ethic of care are two fundamental ethics that are typically necessary and jointly sufficient for the propriety of the respect-for-persons principle. The two ethics can (and should) be integrated in normative ethics and should not be seen as dichotomous alternates to each other. There is no justification for any of the two ethics to enjoy a superordinate position in relation to the other without considering the contexts in which they are applied. I believe that it would benefit the teaching profession if classroom teachers would seek to integrate the two ethics in their professional practice.

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Miriam Mwada Orkar is a doctoral student at the Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction of the University of British Columbia. Her research interest is on the relationship between adults’ moral commitment or moral excellence and their attitudes of racial prejudice.

Copyright rests with the author.